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Abstract 
Free trade areas (FTAs) are arrangements among two or more countries under which they agree to 
eliminate tariffs and nontariff barriers on trade in goods among themselves. However, each country 
maintains its own policies, including tariffs, on trade outside the region. 
In the last few years, the United States has engaged or has proposed to engage in negotiations to 
establish bilateral and regional free trade arrangements with a number of trading partners. Such 
arrangements are not new in U.S. trade policy. The United States has had a free trade arrangement with 
Israel since 1985 and with Canada since 1989, which was expanded to include Mexico and became the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) effective in January 1994. 
U.S. interest in bilateral and regional free trade arrangements surged, and the Bush Administration 
accelerated the pace of negotiations after the enactment of the Trade Promotion Authority in August 
2002. U.S. participation in free trade agreements can occur only with the concurrence of Congress. In 
addition, FTAs affect the U.S. economy, with the impact varying across sectors. 
The 112th Congress and the Obama Administration faced the question of whether and when to act on 
three FTAs pending from the Bush Administration—with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea. Although 
the Bush Administration signed these agreements, it and the leaders of the 110th Congress could not 
reach agreement on proceeding to enact them. No action was taken during the 111th Congress either. 
After discussion with congressional leaders and negotiations with the governments of Colombia, 
Panama, and South Korea to assuage congressional concerns regarding treatment of union officials 
(Colombia), taxation regimes (Panama), and trade in autos (South Korea), President Obama submitted 
draft implementing legislation to Congress on October 3, 2011. The 112th Congress approved each of the 
bills in successive votes on October 12, along with legislation to renew an aspect of the Trade Adjustment 
Assistance (TAA) program. President Obama signed the bills into law on October 21, 2011. 
In the meantime, on November 14, 2009, President Obama committed to work with the current and 
prospective partners in the negotiations to form a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement. The TPP is 
a free trade agreement that includes nations on both sides of the Pacific. The TPP negotiations emerged 
from an FTA that included Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore and that entered into force in 2006. 
Besides the United States, Australia, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, and Vietnam have joined the 
negotiations. Furthermore, the United States has been negotiating with the 28-member European Union to 
form the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). 
FTAs raise some important policy issues: Do FTAs serve or impede U.S. long-term national interests and 
trade policy objectives? Which type of an FTA arrangement meets U.S. national interests? What should 
U.S. criteria be in choosing FTA partners? Are FTAs a substitute for or a complement to U.S. 
commitments and interests in promoting a multilateral trading system via the World Trade Organization 
(WTO)? What effect will the expiration of TPA have on the future of FTAs as a trade policy strategy? FTAs 
as a trade policy strategy? 
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Summary 
Free trade areas (FTAs) are arrangements among two or more countries under which they agree to 
eliminate tariffs and nontariff barriers on trade in goods among themselves. However, each 
country maintains its own policies, including tariffs, on trade outside the region. 
In the last few years, the United States has engaged or has proposed to engage in negotiations to 
establish bilateral and regional free trade arrangements with a number of trading partners. Such 
arrangements are not new in U.S. trade policy. The United States has had a free trade arrangement 
with Israel since 1985 and with Canada since 1989, which was expanded to include Mexico and 
became the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) effective in January 1994. 
U.S. interest in bilateral and regional free trade arrangements surged, and the Bush 
Administration accelerated the pace of negotiations after the enactment of the Trade Promotion 
Authority in August 2002. U.S. participation in free trade agreements can occur only with the 
concurrence of Congress. In addition, FTAs affect the U.S. economy, with the impact varying 
across sectors. 
The 112th Congress and the Obama Administration faced the question of whether and when to act 
on three FTAs pending from the Bush Administration—with Colombia, Panama, and South 
Korea. Although the Bush Administration signed these agreements, it and the leaders of the 110th 
Congress could not reach agreement on proceeding to enact them. No action was taken during the 
111th Congress either.  
After discussion with congressional leaders and negotiations with the governments of Colombia, 
Panama, and South Korea to assuage congressional concerns regarding treatment of union 
officials (Colombia), taxation regimes (Panama), and trade in autos (South Korea), President 
Obama submitted draft implementing legislation to Congress on October 3, 2011. The 112th 
Congress approved each of the bills in successive votes on October 12, along with legislation to 
renew an aspect of the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program. President Obama signed the 
bills into law on October 21, 2011. 
In the meantime, on November 14, 2009, President Obama committed to work with the current 
and prospective partners in the negotiations to form a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement. 
The TPP is a free trade agreement that includes nations on both sides of the Pacific. The TPP 
negotiations emerged from an FTA that included Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore and 
that entered into force in 2006. Besides the United States, Australia, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Peru, and Vietnam have joined the negotiations. Furthermore, the United States has been 
negotiating with the 28-member European Union to form the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP). 
FTAs raise some important policy issues: Do FTAs serve or impede U.S. long-term national 
interests and trade policy objectives? Which type of an FTA arrangement meets U.S. national 
interests? What should U.S. criteria be in choosing FTA partners? Are FTAs a substitute for or a 
complement to U.S. commitments and interests in promoting a multilateral trading system via the 
World Trade Organization (WTO)? What effect will the expiration of TPA have on the future of 
FTAs as a trade policy strategy? 
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n the last few years, the United States has considered bilateral and regional free trade areas 
(FTAs) with a number of trading partners. Such arrangements are not new in U.S. trade 
policy. The United States has had a free trade arrangement with Israel since 1985 and with 
Canada since 1989. The latter was suspended when the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) that included the United States, Canada, and Mexico went into effect in January 1994. 
U.S. interest in bilateral and regional free trade arrangements surged, and the Bush 
Administration accelerated the pace of negotiations after the enactment of the Trade Promotion 
Authority in August 2002. U.S. participation in free trade agreements can occur only with the 
concurrence of Congress. In addition, FTAs affect the U.S. economy, with the impact varying 
across sectors. 
The 112th Congress and the Obama Administration faced the question of whether and when to act 
on three pending FTAs—with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea. Although the Bush 
Administration signed these agreements, it and the leaders of the 110th Congress could not reach 
agreement on proceeding to enact them. No action was taken during the 111th Congress either. In 
addition, the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) expired on July 1, 2007, meaning that any new 
FTAs agreed to would not likely receive expedited legislative consideration, unless the authority 
is renewed.1  
After discussion with congressional leaders and negotiations with the governments of Colombia, 
Panama, and South Korea to assuage congressional concerns regarding treatment of union 
officials (Colombia), taxation regimes (Panama), and trade in autos (South Korea), President 
Obama submitted draft implementing legislation to Congress on October 3, 2011. The 112th 
Congress approved each of the bills in successive votes on October 12, along with legislation to 
renew an aspect of the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program. 
In the meantime, on November 14, 2009, President Obama committed to work with the current 
and prospective partners to form the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement. The TPP is a 
free trade agreement that includes nations on both sides of the Pacific. The TPP grew out of an 
FTA that included Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore. Besides the United States, 
Australia, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, and Vietnam have also joined the 
negotiations.2 Furthermore, the United States is negotiating with the European Union to form the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).3  
FTAs raise some important policy issues: Do FTAs serve or impede U.S. long-term national 
interests and trade policy objectives? Which type of an FTA arrangement meets U.S. national 
interests? What should U.S. criteria be in choosing FTA partners? Are FTAs a substitute for or a 
complement to U.S. commitments and interests in promoting a multilateral trading system via the 
World Trade Organization (WTO)? What effect will the expiration of TPA have on the future of 
FTAs as a trade policy strategy?  
                                                                 
1 For more information on TPA, see CRS Report RL33743, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and the Role of 
Congress in Trade Policy, by William H. Cooper. 
2 For more information on the TPP, see CRS Report R42694, The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Negotiations and 
Issues for Congress, coordinated by Ian F. Fergusson. 
3 For more information on the TTIP, see CRS Report R43387, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
Negotiations, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar and Vivian C. Jones. 
I
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This report will monitor pending and possible proposals for U.S. FTAs, relevant legislation, and 
other 113th Congress interest in U.S. FTAs. 
What Are Free Trade Areas? 
Free trade areas are part of the broad category of trade arrangements under which member-
countries grant one another preferential treatment in trade. Preferential trade arrangements 
include the following: 
• free trade areas (FTAs), under which member countries agree to eliminate 
tariffs and nontariff barriers on trade in goods within the FTA, but each country 
maintains its own trade policies, including tariffs on trade outside the region; 
• customs unions, in which members conduct free trade among themselves and 
maintain common tariffs and other trade policies outside the arrangement; 
• common markets, in which member countries go beyond a customs union by 
eliminating barriers to labor and capital flows across national borders within the 
market; and 
• economic unions, where members merge their economies even further by 
establishing a common currency, and therefore a unified monetary policy, along 
with other common economic institutions. The European Union is the most 
significant example of a group of countries that has gone from a customs union to 
an economic union.4 
The process of forming an FTA usually begins with discussions between trading partners to 
ascertain the feasibility of forming an FTA. If they agree to go forward, then the countries 
undertake negotiations on what the FTA would look like. At a minimum, participants in an FTA 
agree to eliminate tariffs and some other nontariff trade barriers and agree to do so over a specific 
time period. In addition, the partner countries usually agree on rules of origin, that is, a definition 
of what constitutes a product manufactured within the FTA and, therefore, one that is eligible to 
receive duty-free and other preferential trade treatment. Rules of origin prevent products from 
nonmembers entering an FTA market over the lowest tariff wall. Most FTAs also include 
procedures on the settlement of disputes arising among members and rules on the implementation 
of border controls, such as product safety certification and sanitary and phytosanitary 
requirements. Most recent FTAs contain rules on economic activities besides trade in goods, 
including foreign investment, intellectual property rights protection, treatment of labor and 
environment, and trade in services. The size and complexity of the FTA will largely reflect the 
size and complexity of the economic relations among the participating countries. U.S. FTAs with 
Israel and Jordan are relatively basic, while the NAFTA (the United States, Canada, and Mexico) 
is very complex. 
                                                                 
4 Besides the arrangements described above under which member countries extend reciprocal preferential treatment, 
there are trade arrangements under which one party agrees to extend nonreciprocal preferential treatment to the imports 
of a country or group of countries unilaterally. Such arrangements involve primarily developed countries extending 
nonreciprocal preferential treatment to the imports from developing countries. For example, the United States employs 
the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), the Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA), the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative (CBI), and the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The main objective of these nonreciprocal 
arrangements is to encourage economic development in developing countries. 
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Why Countries Form FTAs 
Countries form free trade areas for a number of economic and political reasons. Most basically, 
by eliminating tariffs and some nontariff barriers, FTAs permit the products of FTA partners 
easier access to one another’s markets. The 1989 FTA between the United States and Canada was 
formed arguably for this purpose. Developed countries have also formed FTAs with developing 
countries to encourage them toward trade and investment liberalization. 
FTAs may be used to protect local exporters from losing out to foreign companies that might 
receive preferential treatment under other FTAs. For example, some supporters of the U.S.-Chile 
FTA argued that U.S. firms were at a disadvantage vis-à-vis their Canadian competitors whose 
exports face no Chilean tariffs under the Canada-Chile FTA. Slow progress in multilateral 
negotiations has been another impetus for FTAs. For example, when the 1986-1994 Uruguay 
Round negotiations got bogged down, the impetus for the United States, Mexico, and Canada to 
form NAFTA seemed to increase. Arguably, the surge in FTA formation worldwide in the past 
few years has been a result of the difficulties encountered in launching and implementing the 
Doha Development Agenda round of negotiations in the WTO. 
Political considerations are also a motivation to form FTAs. The United States formed FTAs with 
Israel and with Jordan to reaffirm American support of those countries and to strengthen relations 
with them. 
FTAs in the Context of U.S. Trade Policy 
Post-World War II trade policy under various presidential administrations has had several 
interrelated objectives. One has been to secure open markets for U.S. exports. A second has been 
to protect domestic producers from foreign unfair trade practices and from rapid surges in fairly 
traded imports. A third has been to control trade for foreign policy and national security reasons. 
A fourth objective has been to help foster global trade to promote world economic growth. 
In fulfilling these objectives, U.S. political leaders have formed and conducted trade policy along 
three tracks. One track has been the use of multilateral negotiations to establish and develop a 
rules-based trading system. The United States was a major player in the development and signing 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947. It was a leader in nine rounds of 
negotiations that have expanded the coverage of GATT and that led to the establishment in 1995 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the body that administers the GATT and other 
multilateral trade agreements. The United States has continued this approach as a leader in the 
latest round—the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). 
U.S. policy makers have used a second track, which can be labeled the “unilateral” track. Under 
this approach, the United States threatens retaliation, usually in the form of restricting trade 
partners’ access to the vast U.S. market, in order to get the partner to open its markets to U.S. 
exports or to cease other offensive commercial practices and policies. The United States has 
employed this approach primarily against foreign practices not covered by GATT/WTO rules or 
because the multilateral dispute settlement process proved too slow and ineffective to meet U.S. 
needs. For several decades, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, the United States conducted its 
trade policy with Japan “unilaterally” to get Japan to amend domestic laws, regulations, and 
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practices that prevented U.S. exporters from securing what they considered to be a fair share of 
the Japanese market. 
More and more, however, U.S. trade policy is becoming dominated by a third track—bilateral and 
regional negotiations to establish FTAs. The United States completed its first FTA with Israel in 
1985 under President Reagan. It completed its second with Canada in 1989 under President Bush, 
whose Administration was involved in the process of expanding it to Mexico, a process that was 
completed by the Clinton Administration in 1993. However, even after the completion of 
NAFTA, it was still unclear whether bilateral and regional FTAs had become a fixture in U.S. 
foreign trade policymaking or anomalies to cement already strong economic relationships. 
By 1994 it seemed apparent that FTAs were indeed becoming a fixture when the United States, 
under the Clinton Administration, led a group of trade ministers from 33 other Western 
Hemispheric countries in agreeing to work toward establishing a Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FTAA) by 2005. In the same year, political leaders from the United States and other member-
countries of the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum signed a declaration in 
Bogor, Indonesia, to work toward free trade and investment in the region by 2010 for developed 
countries and by 2020 for all member-countries. Both of those efforts have flagged. 
The pursuit of FTAs continued when, on June 6, 2000, President Clinton and Jordanian King 
Abdullah announced that their two countries would begin negotiations on establishing a free trade 
area. An agreement was quickly reached and was signed on October 24, 2001. Similarly, 
President Clinton and Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong announced, somewhat 
unexpectedly, on November 16, 2000, that their two nations would launch negotiations to 
complete a free trade agreement. And on December 6, 2000, the United States and Chile started 
negotiations to establish an FTA. Chile had long been mentioned as a potential addition to 
NAFTA or as a partner in a stand-alone FTA. 
In the meantime, many countries, including the other major trading powers, were actively 
negotiating free trade agreements. The WTO has reported that more than 200 FTAs are in force. 
For example, Canada formed an FTA with Chile, as did Mexico. The EU has formed FTAs with a 
number of countries. Japan, which had shunned the use of FTAs, formed an FTA with Singapore 
and is exploring the possibility of forming an FTA with Korea, although those negotiations have 
been suspended. 
The Bush Administration had affirmed the strategy of pursuing U.S. trade policy goals through 
the multilateral trade system but gave strong emphasis to building bilateral and regional trade ties 
through free trade agreements through a policy called a competition in liberalization. 
The Bush Administration continued negotiations that the Clinton Administration initiated. At the 
end of 2002, the Bush Administration completed FTA negotiations with Chile and Singapore first 
begun by the Clinton Administration in 2000. The FTAs with Chile and Singapore entered into 
force on January 1, 2004. 
Perhaps encouraged by the passage and enactment of legislation granting the President trade 
promotion authority (TPA), as contained in the Trade Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210—signed into law 
on August 6, 2002), the Bush Administration moved ahead with a trade agenda that contained an 
unprecedented number of FTAs. In 2004, agreements with Australia and Morocco were signed, 
approved by Congress. The agreement with Australia entered into force on January 1, 2005, and 
the one with Morocco on January 1, 2006. An agreement with Central American countries and 
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one with the Dominican Republic were also signed and combined into one agreement, the DR-
CAFTA. The President sent Congress draft implementing legislation on June 23, 2005. The 
House and Senate passed the legislation (H.R. 3045) on July 27 and 28, 2005, respectively, and 
President Bush signed it into law on August 2, 2005 (P.L. 109-53). The agreement with El 
Salvador entered into force on March 1, 2006, with Honduras and Nicaragua on April 1, 2006, 
with Guatemala on July 1, 2006, with the Dominican Republic on March 1, 2007, and with Costa 
Rica on January 1, 2009. 
An agreement with Bahrain was signed on September 14, 2004, for which Congress passed and 
the President signed implementing legislation (H.R. 4340/P.L. 109-169, January 11, 2006). The 
agreement entered into force on August 1, 2006. Congress passed and the President signed 
implementing legislation (P.L. 109-283) for an FTA with Oman, which entered into force on 
January 1, 2009. Under the Bush Administration, the United States signed FTAs with Colombia, 
Peru, Panama, and South Korea (see Table 1).5 The House passed (285-132) on November 8, 
2007, and the Senate passed on December 4, 2007, implementing legislation (H.R. 3688) for the 
U.S.-Peru FTA. The President signed the bill into law (P.L. 110-138) on December 14, 2007. The 
FTA entered into force on February 1, 2009. 
After several months of negotiations, on May 10, 2007, congressional leaders and the Bush 
Administration reached an agreement on new policy priorities that are to be included in pending 
FTAs. These priorities included the enforcement of five core labor standards that are part of the 
International Labor Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights of Work; 
commitment to enforce seven multilateral environmental agreements to which FTA partners are 
parties; the availability of affordable generic pharmaceuticals; port security; and foreign investor 
rights in investor-state disputes. 
Obama Administration Policy and Recent 
Developments 
President Obama and his Administration had expressed support for three pending FTAs from the 
Bush Administration—with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea—but with the understanding 
that some outstanding issues needed to be addressed. Specifically, regarding Colombia, critics, 
particularly labor unions, remain concerned about the treatment of union leaders and other labor 
activists. While supporters cited data showing that violence against union leaders had decreased, 
critics charged that the violence was still unacceptably high.6 Regarding Panama, the primary 
concerns raised pertained to Panamanian tax policy, which, critics charged, allowed Panama to be 
a haven for companies and individuals to avoid taxes.7  
The South Korean agreement was the most challenging case. Some Detroit-based car 
manufacturers, especially Ford and Chrysler, had opposed the agreement because, they asserted, 
                                                                 
5 The President submitted implementing legislation for the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement which was 
introduced in the 110th Congress (H.R. 5724/S. 2830) on April 8, 2008. However, the House voted (H.Res. 1092) to 
make certain expedited procedures, including established deadlines under Section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974, not 
applicable to the bill. The 110th Congress took no further action on the legislation. 
6 CRS Report RL34470, The U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Background and Issues, by M. Angeles Villarreal. 
7 CRS Report RL32540, The U.S.-Panama Free Trade Agreement, by J. F. Hornbeck. 
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the agreement did not adequately address South Korean barriers to auto imports. (GM had taken a 
neutral position on the KORUS FTA.) However, as a result of the modifications agreed to in 
December 2010, most of which pertain to autos, both Ford and Chrysler support approval of the 
KORUS FTA, as does the United Auto Workers (UAW) union. U.S.-based steel manufacturers 
have also opposed the agreement because, they argued, it would weaken U.S. trade remedy 
(antidumping, countervailing duty) laws. Other major labor unions, including the AFL-CIO, 
oppose the agreement.8  
On April 6, 2011, the Obama Administration announced that Colombia had agreed to an “Action 
Plan Related to Labor Rights” laying out steps it was prepared to take to resolve the labor rights 
issues.9 Panama and the United States came to a resolution on the tax transparency issue by 
agreeing to a Tax Information and Exchange Agreement (TIEA), which Panama ratified on April 
13, 2011. The TIEA permits either country to request information on most types of federal (U.S.) 
or national (Panama) taxes. To address the tax haven issue, Article 7 specifically allows for tax 
information exchange “under the existing Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal 
Matters,” which covers money laundering among other illicit financial activities.  
Eventually, President Obama submitted draft implementing legislation to Congress on October 3, 
2011, for each of the FTAs. The 112th Congress approved each of the bills in successive votes on 
October 12, along with legislation to renew an aspect of the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) 
program, and the President signed them into law on October 21, 2012. The U.S.-South Korean 
agreement entered into force on March 15, 2012, the U.S.-Colombia FTA entered into force on 
May 15, 2012, and the U.S.- Panama FTA entered into force on October 31, 2012. 
In the meantime, on November 14, 2009, President Obama committed to work with the current 
and prospective members of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP). 
The TPP is a free trade agreement that includes nations on both sides of the Pacific. Negotiations 
on the TPP, which grew out of an FTA among four countries—Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and 
Singapore—now include, besides the United States, Australia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, 
and Vietnam. Furthermore, the United States and the European Union have expressed their 
intention to negotiate an FTA—the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). 
                                                                 
8 CRS Report RL34330, The U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA): Provisions and Implications, 
coordinated by William H. Cooper. 
9 For more information see, CRS Report RL34470, The U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Background and Issues, 
by M. Angeles Villarreal. 
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Table 1. U.S. Free Trade Agreements 
FTAs in Force 
U.S.-Israel FTA Implemented by P.L. 99-47 (June 11, 1985). Entered into force September 1, 1985. 
U.S.-Canada FTA Implemented by P.L. 100-449 (September 28, 1988). Entered into force January 1, 1989. 
Suspended with implementation of NAFTA. 
North American Free 
Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) 
Implemented by P.L. 103-182 (December 8, 1993). Entered into force January 1, 1994. 
U.S.-Jordan FTA Implemented by P.L. 107-43 (September 28, 2001). Entered into force December 17, 
2001. 
U.S.-Singapore FTA Implemented by P.L. 108-78 (September 3, 2003). Entered into force January 1, 2004. 
U.S.-Chile FTA Implemented by P.L. 108-77 (September 3, 2003). Entered into force January 1, 2004. 
U.S.-Australia FTA Implemented by P.L. 108-286 (August 3, 2004). Entered into force on January 1, 2005. 
U.S.-Morocco FTA Implemented by P.L. 108-302 (August 17, 2004). Entered into force on January 1, 2006.  
U.S.-Bahrain FTA Implemented by P.L. 109-169 (January 11, 2006). Entered into force on August 1, 2006. 
U.S.-Dominican Republic-
Central American FTA 
(DR-CAFTA)  
President signed implementing bill (H.R. 3045) on August 2, 2005 (P.L. 109-53). Entered 
into force with El Salvador (March 1, 2006), Honduras and Nicaragua (April 1, 2006), 
Guatemala (July 1, 2006), the Dominican Republic (March 1, 2007), and Costa Rica 
(January 1, 2009). 
U.S.-Oman FTA President signed implementing bill on September 26, 2006 (P.L. 109-283). Entered into 
force on January 1, 2009. 
U.S.-Peru FTA Agreement with Peru signed April 12, 2006. President signed implementing bill (H.R. 
3688) on December 14, 2007 (P.L. 110-138). Implemented on February 1, 2009. 
U.S.-Colombia FTA Agreement signed November 22, 2006. Congress approved implementing legislation 
(H.R. 3078) on October 21, 2011, and the President signed it into law on October 21, 
2011 (P.L. 112-42). Entered into force on May 15, 2012. 
U.S.-South Korea FTA Agreement signed on June 30, 2007. Congress approved implementing legislation (H.R. 
3080) on October 21, 2011, and the President signed it into law on October 21, 2011 
(P.L. 112-41). Entered into force on March 15, 2012. 
 
U.S.-Panama FTA Agreement signed on June 28, 2007. Congress approved implementing legislation (H.R. 
3079) on October 12, and the President signed it into law on October 21, 2011 (P.L. 
112-43). The agreement entered into force on October 31, 2012. 
 FTAs Under Negotiation  
Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement (TPP) 
Negotiations underway. 
Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) 
Negotiations underway. 
 
 
Free Trade Agreements: Impact on U.S. Trade and Implications for U.S. Trade Policy 
 
Congressional Research Service 8 
Economic Impact of FTAs 
The surge in U.S. interest in FTAs and in the formation of FTAs worldwide raises the question of 
their impact on the countries included in an FTA and on the rest of the world. It is an issue that 
economists have long studied and debated. Interest in the issue has peaked at various times in the 
post-World War II period. The first time was the formation of the European Common Market. 
Interest has peaked again with the current trends in FTAs. The debate has relied largely on theory 
since empirical data are scarce save for the experience of the European Union. The debate has 
also divided economists between those who strongly oppose FTAs as an economically inefficient 
mechanism and those who support them as a means to build freer trade. 
Economists usually base their analysis of the impact of FTAs on the concepts of trade creation 
and trade diversion. These concepts were first developed by economist Jacob Viner in 1950.10 
Viner focused his work on the economic effects of customs unions, but his conclusions have been 
largely applied to FTAs and other preferential trade arrangements. His analysis was also confined 
to static (one-time) effects of these arrangements. 
Trade creation occurs when a member of an FTA replaces domestic production of a good with 
imports of the good from another member of the FTA, because the formation of the FTA has 
made it cheaper to import rather than produce domestically. The creation of the trade is said to 
improve economic welfare within the group because resources are being shifted to more efficient 
uses. Trade diversion occurs when a member of an FTA switches its import of a good from an 
efficient nonmember to a less efficient member because the removal of tariffs within the group 
and the continuation of tariffs on imports from nonmembers make it cheaper to do so. Trade 
diversion is said to reduce economic welfare because resources are being diverted from an 
efficient producer to a less efficient producer. 
In most cases, it appears that FTAs lead to both trade diversion and trade creation with the net 
effects determined by the structure of the FTA. Therefore, even if two or more countries are 
moving toward freer trade among themselves in an FTA, the FTA could make those countries and 
the world as a whole worse off if the FTA diverts more trade than it creates, according to 
economic theory.11 (See box below for illustrative examples of trade diversion and trade creation.) 
 
                                                                 
10 Viner, Jacob. The Customs Union Issue. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1950. New York. 
11 This conclusion is called the General Theory of the Second Best and was developed by economists Richard Lipsey 
and Kelvin Lancaster. Lipsey, Richard and Kelvin Lancaster. The General Theory of the Second Best. Review of 
Economic Studies. vol 24. p. 11-32. Cited and discussed in Lawrence, Robert Z. International National Economies: 
Regionalism, Multilateralism, and Deeper Integration. Brookings Institution. Washington, DC. 1996. p. 22. 
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Trade Creation or Trade Diversion?
Economist Robert Z. Lawrence has provided the following example to illustrate the difference between trade 
creation and trade diversion: 
Assume that prior to implementing a free trade agreement with the United States, all television sets purchased in 
Mexico are subject to a tariff of 10%. Assume that Japan produces TVs under competitive conditions, which it sells at 
a cost of $100, but the United States could only produce such sets at $105. Initially, all TVs sold in Mexico and 
elsewhere would be Japanese. These would be imported at a price of $100 from Japan and sold to Mexican 
consumers for $110, with the additional $10 representing the tariff that would be paid by Mexican consumers to the 
Mexican government. Assume now that a free trade agreement is signed between Mexico and the United States 
which removes tariffs between Mexico and the United States but retains Mexican tariffs on other countries. Mexican 
consumers will now have a choice between buying American TVs, which will sell in Mexico at $105, or Japanese TVs, 
which will sell at $110. They will buy the U.S. TVs and be better off. However, the Mexican economy as a whole will 
be worse off. Before the agreement, Mexico bought TVs from Japan. Although consumers paid $110, $10 was just a 
transfer from Mexican consumers to the Mexican government. The economy as a whole, therefore, spent $100 per 
TV. After the agreement, however, Mexico is spending $105 per TV. TV prices in Mexico do not reflect their social 
opportunity costs. The impact of the agreement is to expand TV production in the United States, which is relatively 
less efficient, and to reduce it in Japan, which is relatively more efficient. 
Of course, not all of the increased trade between partners will represent expansion from a less efficient source. Pure 
trade creation would also result. Assume in the example that initially Mexico could produce TV sets for $107. In this 
case, prior to the agreement Mexico would not have imported them from Japan, instead it would have supplied these 
TV sets domestically. In this case, Mexico would benefit from the agreement, which would allow it [to] pay only $105 
per TV, although of course it would have done better by liberalizing fully and buying the sets from Japan. 
Source: Lawrence, Robert Z. International National Economies: Regionalism, Multilateralism, and Deeper Integration. 
Brookings Institution. Washington. 1996. pp. 24-25. 
 
Trade policy makers encounter circumstances much more complicated than those depicted in 
economic theory. Many functioning and proposed FTAs encompass more than two countries and 
involve a range of products, both goods and services, making it much more challenging to 
evaluate their economic impact. To provide an analytical framework, some economists have 
developed sets of conditions under which, they have concluded, an FTA would create more trade 
than it diverts. They state that trade creation is likely to exceed trade diversion— 
• the larger the tariffs or other trade barriers among members before the FTA is 
formed; 
• the lower the tariffs and other barriers in trade with nonmembers; 
• the greater the number of countries included in the FTA; 
• the more competitive or the less complementary the economies joining the FTA; 
and 
• the closer the economic relationship among the members before the FTA was 
formed.12 
Economists also have determined that, along with the immediate, static effects of trade diversion 
and creation, FTAs generate long-term dynamic effects that might include the following: 
                                                                 
12 Salvatore, Dominick. International Economics. Fifth Edition. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1995, pp. 305-
306. 
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• increased efficiency of production as producers face increased competition with 
the removal of trade barriers; 
• economies of scale, that is, decreased unit costs of production as producers can 
have larger production runs since the markets for their goods have been enlarged; 
and 
• increased foreign investment from outside the FTA as firms seek to locate 
operations within the borders of the FTA to take advantage of the preferential 
trade arrangements.13 
Until recently not many FTAs were in operation; therefore, available data on their impact have 
been limited to the experience of the formation of the European Common Market and 
subsequently the European Union. Most studies have concluded that the European Community 
has resulted in more trade creation than trade diversion. However, in some sectors, such as 
agriculture, the net effect has been trade diversion because the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy 
raised barriers to agricultural trade outside the EU.14 
FTAs and the WTO 
A basic principle of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that is administered by 
the WTO is the most-favored nation (MFN) principle. Article I of GATT requires that “any 
advantage, favor, privilege, or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product 
originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other 
contracting parties.” FTAs, by definition, violate the MFN principle, since products of FTA 
member countries are given preferential treatment over nonmember products. However, the 
original GATT signatories recognized that FTAs and customs unions, while violating the MFN 
principle, improve economic welfare of all members, if certain conditions are met to minimize 
trade diversion. 
Article XXIV of the GATT requires that FTA members shall not erect higher or more restrictive 
tariff or nontariff barriers on trade with nonmembers than existed prior to the formation of the 
FTA. Furthermore, Article XXIV requires the elimination of tariffs and other trade restrictions be 
applied to “substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in products originating in 
such territories.” In addition, Article XXIV stipulates that the elimination of duties and other trade 
restrictions on trade within the FTA be accomplished “within a reasonable length of time,” 
meaning a period of no longer than 10 years, according to the “Understanding of the 
Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade” reached during 
the Uruguay Round. Member countries are required to report to the WTO their intention to form 
FTAs. In addition to Article XXIV, the “Enabling Clause,” agreed to by GATT signatories in 
1979, allows developing countries to form preferential trading arrangements without the 
conditions under Article XXIV. 
                                                                 
13 Ibid, p.307. 
14 CRS Report 97-663. Regional Trade Agreements: Implications for U.S. Trade Policy, by George Holliday (out of 
print; available from author). 
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Article V of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the agreement that governs 
trade in services under the WTO, provides for the preferential treatment of trade in services 
within FTAs or similar regional trading arrangements. Article V lays out requirements of 
substantial coverage of the elimination of trade restrictions and the prohibition on the ex post 
facto imposition of higher restrictions on services trade with nonmember countries. 
The WTO formed the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) in 1996 to review 
pending and operating FTAs and customs unions to determine whether they conform to WTO 
rules under the GATT and the GATS. However, the rules are sufficiently ambiguous as to be 
subject to continuing debate within the CRTA. For example, the members have been unable to 
agree on what constitutes “substantially all trade” under Article XXIV (GATT) or “substantially 
all sectors” under Article V (GATS).15 The number of FTAs and customs unions worldwide has 
increased at a rapid rate. As of July 2010, 474 FTAs and customs unions had been notified to the 
GATT/WTO. Some 283 FTAs and customs unions are in force. The remaining FTAs and customs 
unions were largely superseded by other agreements involving the same participants.16 
Yet, none of the reports of notifications has been completed because CRTA members have not 
been able to reach a consensus on any of them. Nevertheless, the vast majority of the FTAs have 
gone into operation. For example, the CRTA has not completed its report on NAFTA, which went 
into effect in January 1994. The proliferation of FTAs and disagreements on rules have crippled 
the WTO review process and led WTO members to place review of the rules on regional 
agreements on the agenda of the Doha Development Agenda round. The Doha Ministerial 
Declaration, which established the agenda for the new round, states that the negotiations will 
strive at “clarifying and improving disciplines and procedures under the existing WTO provisions 
applying to regional trade agreements.” 
The Debate Over FTAs 
The surge in the number of FTAs worldwide has been driving a spirited debate among experts, 
policy makers, and other observers over whether they promote or damage U.S. economic interests 
and the economic interests of the world at large. The differing views can be categorized into three 
main groups. One group consists of those who oppose FTAs because, they assert, FTAs 
undermine the development of the multilateral trading system and act as a “stumbling block” to 
global trade liberalization. A second group supports FTAs because, they believe, FTAs act as a 
“building block” to multilateral trade liberalization. The third category are those individuals and 
groups that are opposed to trade liberalization in general because they believe its impact on 
workers in import-sensitive sectors or on the environment is unacceptable, or because, they assert, 
it undermines U.S. sovereignty. 
Among representatives of the first group of experts are international economists Jagdish 
Bhagwati and Anne O. Krueger, who have strongly advocated that the United States and other 
national governments should not pursue FTAs at the expense of multilateral negotiations in the 
WTO. Bhagwati has concluded that FTAs are by definition discriminatory and therefore trade 
diverting. He argues that tariffs remain high on many goods imported into developing countries 
and even on some labor-intensive goods (such as wearing apparel and agricultural products) 
                                                                 
15 The CRTA meets several times during the year. 
16 http://www.wto.org. 
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imported into developed countries. Consequently, he asserts, trade diversion will likely result 
when an FTA is formed.17 
Both Bhagwati and Krueger cite the “rules of origin” and other conditions of an FTA’s 
establishment for strong criticism. Bhagwati claims, for example, that the rules of origin in one 
FTA more than likely do not coincide with the rules of origin in many of the other FTAs. 
Furthermore, he argues, the schedule of implementation of the tariff reductions and other 
conditions for one FTA will not match the schedule of other FTAs. The incongruity of these 
regulations across FTAs has created what Bhagwati sees as a customs administration nightmare 
and calls the “spaghetti-bowl” phenomenon.18 
In her criticism, Krueger claims that in order to meet the input thresholds of rules of origin 
requirements, producers in one FTA partner will be encouraged to purchase as many inputs as 
possible from other partner countries, even if a non-FTA member can produce and sell the inputs 
more cheaply and even if the tariff rate on inputs from non-FTA producers is zero. Importing 
inputs from within the FTA to meet the rules of origin threshold allows the producer to sell the 
final product within the FTA duty free. Under such circumstances imports of inputs are diverted 
from efficient producers outside the FTA to less efficient producers inside the FTA. A corollary to 
Krueger’s conclusion is that the higher the threshold established in the rules of origin, the greater 
the chance that trade diversion will take place.19 
A range of economists, policy makers, and other experts embrace a second view that FTAs can 
enhance trade and should be pursued. Economist Robert Z. Lawrence argues, for example, that 
recent FTAs involve much more economic integration than the elimination of tariffs. NAFTA, he 
points out, has led to the reduction in barriers on services trade, foreign investment, and other 
economic activities not covered by the GATT/WTO. In addition, under NAFTA, Mexico has 
affirmed its commitment to economic reform, making its economy more efficient. Lawrence 
asserts that the theory traditionally applied to FTAs (by Bhagwati, Krueger, and others) does not 
take into account these dynamic welfare enhancing characteristics of FTAs, which he believes are 
likely to outweigh any trade diversion that results from the elimination of tariffs.20 
A CATO Institute study by economist Edward L. Hudgins argues that while it may be preferable 
to liberalize trade multilaterally, countries should take any available avenue, including bilateral or 
regional FTAs, even if they lead to some trade diversion. Furthermore, Hudgins asserts that FTAs 
can be more efficient vehicles for addressing difficult trade barriers than the WTO, where the 
large membership requires compromise to the least common denominator to achieve consensus. 
FTAs have also have provided momentum for GATT/WTO members to move ahead with new 
trade rounds, he claims.21 
                                                                 
17 Bhagwati, Jagdish. The Wind of the Hundred Days: How Washington Mismanaged Globalization. The MIT Press. 
Cambridge, MA. 2000. p. 240-245. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Krueger, Anne O. “Free Trade Agreements As Protectionist Devices: Rules of Origin,” in Melvin, James R., James 
C. Moore, and Raymond Riezman (eds.). Trade, Theory, and Econometrics: Essays in Honor of John C. Chipman. 
Routledge Press. New York. 1999. pp. 91-101. 
20 Lawrence, Robert Z. Regionalism, Multilateralism, and Deeper Integration: Changing Paradigms for Developing 
Countries. in Mendoza, Miguel Rodriquez, Patrick Low, and Barbara Kotschwar (eds.). Trade Rules in the Making. 
Organization of American States/Brookings Institution Press. Washington, DC. 1999. p. 41-45. 
21 Hudgins, Edward. L. Regional and Multilateral Trade Agreements: Complementary Means to Open Markets. Cato 
Journal. Vol. 15. No. 23. Fall/Winter 1995/96. 
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Economist C. Fred Bergsten holds a position similar to the one expressed in the CATO study, that 
in lieu of multilateral trade negotiations, FTAs are the next best thing and promote global trade 
liberalization. Bergsten has advocated establishing U.S. FTAs with New Zealand and with South 
Korea. Economist Jeffrey Schott argues that some U.S. firms are being discriminated against 
because FTAs are rapidly forming in which the United States is not a participant; therefore, in his 
review, the United States must negotiate FTAs.22 
Bergsten and others have also advocated structuring FTAs in a manner that could serve as 
building blocks of a global free trade system. Using the APEC plan as a model, Bergsten argues 
for an FTA based on “open regionalism,” that is, establishing the road map for free trade and 
investment in the Asian-Pacific region for 2010/2020 among the members but allowing other 
countries to join if they agree to accede to the conditions. In order to minimize trade diversion, he 
suggests that trade and investment could be implemented on an MFN principle, perhaps 
conditional MFN in order to limit the “free rider” effects. Other countries, and other regional 
groupings, Bergsten presumes, would be willing to accept the conditions having been enticed by 
the trade and investment opportunities until most of the membership of the WTO would be 
engaged in forming a free trade area.23 A Heritage Foundation report draws up a similar proposal 
for a “Global Free Trade Association.”24 
A third group opposes FTAs but also trade liberalization or “globalization” in general. Included in 
this group are representatives of import-sensitive industries, for example labor unions, and 
representatives of social action groups such as some environmentalists, who question the wisdom 
of trade liberalization whether done through multilateral negotiations or through bilateral and 
regional trading arrangements. They assert that trade liberalization unfairly affects workers by 
exporting jobs to countries with lower wages and undermines the nation’s ability to protect the 
environment by allowing companies to relocate to countries with less stringent environmental 
regulations.25 For example, the United Auto Workers (UAW) union has stated the following 
position regarding the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA): 
Such an agreement would provide broader protections for the rights of corporations, further 
undermine the ability of governments in the region to regulate their economies in the 
interests of their citizens and intensify the downward pressure on workers’ incomes through 
competition for jobs and investments. All of this would take place in the absence of any 
counter-balancing protections for workers, consumers or the environment. This is why the 
UAW has consistently opposed the direction of these negotiations, the positions taken by the 
U.S. government, and worked closely with other organizations in the region to oppose the 
creation of an FTAA.26 
                                                                 
22 Schott, Jeffrey J. Free Trade Agreements: The Cost of U.S. Nonparticipation. Testimony before the Subcommittee 
on Trade. House Ways and Means Committee. March 29, 2001. http://www.iie.com. 
23 Bergsten, C. Fred. Open Regionalism. Working paper 97. Institute for International Economics. 1997. 
24 Hulsman, John C. and Aaron Schavey. The Global Free Trade Association: A New Trade Agenda. The Heritage 
Foundation Backgrounder No. 1441. May 16, 2001. 
25 For more information, see for example, the United Auto Workers positions on trade policy at http://www.uaw.com 
and the positions of Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch at http://www.citizen.org. 
26 http://www.uaw.com. 
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Conclusions and Implications for Congress 
Free trade agreements are viewed by many as a significant trade policy vehicle for the United 
States and for other major trading nations. Over the last 10-15 years, the debate in U.S. trade 
policy has shifted from, “Should the United States form FTAs?” to “Should the United States 
form any more FTAs and, if so, with whom, when, and under what conditions?” Congress has a 
direct role in addressing those questions. Before any FTA can go into effect, Congress must 
review it as part of implementing legislation. 
A number of questions regarding FTAs could arise as the Obama Administration pursues the TPP, 
and Congress oversees and evaluates overall U.S. trade policy strategy. One question pertains to 
the economic impact of an FTA. As with any trade liberalizing measure, an FTA can have positive 
effects on some sectors and adverse effects on others. An FTA may create trade for one sector of 
the U.S. economy but divert trade away from others. A Member of Congress is placed in the 
position of weighing the effects on his/her constituency versus the overall impact on the United 
States and other trading partners. Because conditions can differ radically from one FTA to 
another, the evaluation will likely differ in each case. Furthermore, Members might take into 
account not only the immediate static effects of FTAs but also the long-term, dynamic effects, 
which could play an important role in evaluating their contribution to U.S. economy. 
A second, broader question is whether bilateral and regional FTAs are the appropriate trade policy 
strategy to promote U.S. national interests. Economic specialists differ sharply on this question, 
with some viewing the proliferation of FTAs as leading to confusion and serving as stumbling 
blocks to the development of a rules-based multilateral trading system. Other specialists consider 
FTAs as appropriate trade policy vehicles for promoting freer trade, as building blocks to a 
multilateral system, and as necessary to protect U.S. interests against the FTAs that other 
countries are forming without the United States. Still others oppose trade liberalization in any 
form as counter to U.S. interests. 
A third question is whether the Office of the United States Trade Representative and other trade 
policy agencies have sufficient time and human resources to negotiate a number of FTAs 
simultaneously while managing trade policy in the WTO and other fora. Others might find some 
U.S. interests being short-changed. 
A fourth question is to what degree, if any, should non-trade concerns be included in FTAs? This 
issue has emerged in a number of completed and ongoing FTA negotiations. 
A fifth overarching question is what criteria should the United States employ in determining 
which countries would make appropriate FTA partners. For example, to what degree should 
political factors be given weight over economic factors? 
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